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Permission to believe is not permission to believe at will

Published version
Peer-reviewed

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Authors

Kieval, Phillip Hintikka  ORCID logo  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5369-0322

Abstract

jats:titleAbstract</jats:title>jats:pAccording to doxastic involuntarism, we cannot believe at will. In this paper, I argue that permissivism, the view that, at times, there is more than one way to respond rationally to a given body of evidence, is consistent with doxastic involuntarism. Rober (Mind 128(511):837–859, 2019a, Philos Phenom Res 1–17, 2019b) argues that, since permissive situations are possible, cognitively healthy agents can believe at will. However, Roeber (Philos Phenom Res 1–17, 2019b) fails to distinguish between two different arguments for voluntarism, both of which can be shown to fail by proper attention to different accounts of permissivism. Roeber considers a generic treatment of permissivism, but key premises in both arguments depend on different, more particular notions of permissivism. Attending to the distinction between single-agent and inter-subjective versions of permissivism reveals that the inference from permissivism to voluntarism is unwarranted.</jats:p>

Description

Funder: Gates Cambridge Trust; doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100005370

Keywords

Original Research, Doxastic agency, Doxastic voluntarism, Involuntarism, Permissivism, Uniqueness

Journal Title

Synthese

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0039-7857
1573-0964

Volume Title

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC