FINDING THE BRITISH GOOGLE: RELAXING THE PROHIBITION OF DUAL-CLASS STOCK FROM THE PREMIUM-TIER OF THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE


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Abstract

jats:titleAbstract</jats:title>jats:pThere is a dearth of British tech-companies listing on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and the LSE lacks a large, innovative tech-company such as Google. The UK Government, concerned as to the loss of UK tech-companies to foreign acquirors, views the encouragement of UK tech-firm listings as a policy priority. Dual-class stock, currently prohibited from the LSE Main Market's premium-tier, allows founders to list their firms, and retain majority-control, while holding significantly less of the cash-flow rights in the company. This article will broach the potential for dual-class stock to attract UK tech-company listings, and explore the benefits that dual-class stock can engender for UK tech-companies and their public shareholders. The risks of dual-class structures will also be discussed, but it will be shown that in a UK regulatory context, in relation to high-growth tech-companies, the risks may not be as severe as presumed, and easily moderated through judicious controls.</jats:p>

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Keywords
dual-class stock, listing rules, long-termism, one-share-one-vote, big tech
Journal Title
CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL
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Journal ISSN
0008-1973
1469-2139
Volume Title
79
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
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All rights reserved