Knowledge and Cognition in Kant

Abstract

Kant’s legacy, according to contemporary epistemology textbooks, is a theory about the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge and the status of our experiential knowledge. Much of Kant’s moral philosophy is similarly concerned with the possibility of practical knowledge. Thus, claims about various types of knowledge and their conditions of possibility are central to Kant’s philosophy and its contemporary influence. Until recently, however, commentators paid relatively little attention to what “knowledge” means for Kant. This period of complacency has come to an end. Commentators such as Eric Watkins and Marcus Willaschek have raised awareness, showing that Kant uses two distinct terms that can reasonably be translated as knowledge: cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen). This work has established a new branch in Kant scholarship that seeks to clarify the meaning of Kant’s epistemic concepts. Despite minor disagreements, a new consensus about Kant’s “knowledge terms” has emerged. First, Kant’s concept of knowledge (Wissen) is likened to our concept of knowledge. Specifically, it is explained as a propositional attitude (namely, Fürwahrhalten) that must satisfy certain justification conditions. Second, it is argued that cognition (Erkenntnis) is unlike our contemporary concept of knowledge, describing some lower or prior epistemic achievement that need not be true. Very roughly, cognition is seen as a concept of Kant’s transcendental psychology, whereas knowledge is taken to be a properly epistemic concept. In this thesis, I challenge this new interpretive consensus. I argue that Kant’s usage of the two “knowledge terms” of Erkenntnis and Wissen is best explained as reflecting two distinct frameworks of epistemological norms. On the one hand, some of Kant’s epistemological claims are based on an account of our cognitive capacities conceived in abstraction from their concrete application. Kant’s concept of cognition (Erkenntnis) expresses the successful exercise of our cognitive capacities in this abstract, non-concrete sense. This allows Kant to ignore certain complexities, or “causes of error,” that must be considered in concrete cases. I call this the Capacity Framework. On the other hand, once an in-abstracto theory of our cognitive capacities is established, questions arise about their concrete application. Here, epistemic norms must reflect complexities and “causes of error” in concrete situations. Kant’s concept of knowledge (Wissen) must be understood as part of a theory of epistemic rules and norms for this sense of real-world, concrete judging. I call this the Concrete Framework. My interpretation reverses the current consensus on the relation of Erkenntnis and Wissen to each other and to our contemporary concept of knowledge. Kant’s concept of cognition is most thoroughly and purely “epistemic” in the sense that it is exclusively defined by the principles of our cognitive capacities. Therefore, it plays a similar role in Kant’s philosophy as our contemporary concept of knowledge. Moreover, and in contrast to recent scholarship, I argue that Kantian cognition satisfies contemporary conditions of knowledge, such as justification, truth, and belief. Conversely, Kant’s concept of knowledge (Wissen) is a concept of “real-world cognition.” In concrete contexts, we aim for the same epistemic standard of success as in cognition: objectively real and, thus, true judgement. However, in concrete judging, there is an ineliminable chance of failure, and we lack criteria to rule out the possibility of error. Thus, a different set of norms is needed to decide whether a concrete judgement (Fürwahrhalten) counts as knowledge (Wissen). These norms are not justification conditions but conditions of the strength of individual and public acceptance of a judgement. Knowledge, for Kant, requires both strong individual and public acceptance (individual conviction and universal certainty) of a judgement. My proposal clarifies the value of cognition, explains why Kant talks about cognition more frequently, and shows that Kant has a powerful background framework of epistemic normativity. For rival accounts, it is sometimes unclear why Kant would spend so much time and effort talking about cognition. My proposal shows that cognition is Kant’s term for successful judgements, satisfying the epistemic standard of objective reality. This explains why cognition is epistemically valuable and, thus, why Kant devotes so much ink to explaining its possibility. Kant’s two normative frameworks enable him to bracket certain features of real-world judging that are irrelevant to a theory of our cognitive capacities. So, my account offers a new and systematic explanation for Kant’s use of Wissen and Erkenntnis across his critical work, including Kant’s moral philosophy, as motivated by two distinct but related epistemological frameworks. My account should also be interesting for contemporary philosophers. Kant’s distinction between two “knowledge terms” enables him to commit to an infallibilist concept of cognition whilst acknowledging the messiness of real-world epistemic efforts. The separate concept of knowledge (Wissen) allows Kant to develop something like an “ethics of belief.” Concrete judging (Fürwahrhalten) is guided by the epistemic ideal of cognition. At the same time, Kant’s concept of Fürwahrhalten (and thereby Wissen) allows him to take pragmatic and moral considerations into account. Thus, Kant’s dual-framework approach is an attractive tool to accommodate conflicting intuitions, such as about the fallibility of knowledge or about pragmatic encroachment.