Exploiting quasiperiodic electromagnetic radiation using software-defined radio


Type
Thesis
Change log
Authors
O'Connell, Christian David 
Abstract

Electronic devices emanate unintentional electromagnetic radiation from which an attacker can extract sensitive information. In video display units these are quasiperiodic: nearly periodic in the short term. Video-eavesdropping attacks on these, a main motivation for the use of TEMPEST shielded equipment in security-critical applications, have evolved little since first publicly demonstrated by van Eck in 1985. I investigate digital signal processing techniques that exploit the quasiperiodic nature of digital video signals, with TMDS-encoded data on HDMI/DVI cables as the main example.

After first discussing the practicalities of intercepting compromising emanations from the UHF frequency band, using a software-defined radio platform to perform IQ down conversion, I outline the process to carry out a video eavesdropping attack, and methods for rasterising intercepted data.

Using a database of video modes, such as VESA and CEA standards, I identify viable eavesdropping targets by fitting likely harmonics of emanating clock signals to a model. Video signals contain blanking intervals that create characteristic periodicities; cepstral features can be used to eliminate false positives, and provide improved performance over autocorrelation as a method of recovering synchronisation frequencies.

The signal-to-noise ratio of intercepted emanations is often very poor. Coherent periodic averaging in the complex domain can suppress noise and uncorrelated background sources. I design a phase-locked loop to perform clock recovery and synchronisation of the video signal, negating the effects of temperature drift in the local oscillators. This permits averaging arbitrary-length recordings, increasing the range at which an attack can be performed. I discuss the implications this may have on existing protection standards.

Finally, I present a method to recover bandwidths higher than that which the SDR frontend hardware is nominally capable of. I use the cross-correlation between multiple overlapping lower-bandwidth recordings to correct time and phase offsets, and a zero-phase Linkwitz-Riley filter pair to combine them. The resulting higher-bandwidth recordings improve raster clarity, and enable use of a hidden Markov model to recover colour information.

Description
Date
2018-09-10
Advisors
Kuhn, Markus
Keywords
Digital Signal Processing, TEMPEST, Side-channel attack
Qualification
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Awarding Institution
University of Cambridge