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dc.contributor.authorD'Ignazio, Alessio
dc.contributor.authorGiovannetti, Emanuele
dc.date.accessioned2006-03-16T09:47:33Z
dc.date.available2006-03-16T09:47:33Z
dc.date.issued2006-02
dc.identifier.otherCWPE0621
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/131678
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/131678
dc.description.abstract‘Unfair’ Discrimination in Two-sided Peering? Evidence from LINX Abstract: Does asymmetry between Internet Providers affect the “fairness” of their interconnection contracts? While recent game theoretic literature provides contrasting answers to this question, there is a lack of empirical research. We introduce a novel dataset on micro-interconnection policies and provide an econometric analysis of the determinants of peering decisions amongst the Internet Service Providers interconnecting at the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX). Our key result shows that two different metrics, introduced to capture asymmetry, exert opposite effects. Asymmetry in “market size” enhances the quality of the link, while asymmetry in “network centrality” induces quality degradation, hence “unfairer” interconnection conditions.en
dc.format.extent133968 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subjectInternet Peeringen
dc.subjectTwo-sided Marketsen
dc.subjectNetwork Industriesen
dc.subjectAntitrusten
dc.title‘Unfair’ Discrimination in Two-sided Peering? Evidence from LINXen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5439


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