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dc.contributor.authorGoderis, Benedikt
dc.contributor.authorWagner, Wolf
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-19T13:22:58Z
dc.date.available2010-05-19T13:22:58Z
dc.date.issued2005-10
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/225157
dc.description.abstractWe study the introduction of credit protection on sovereign debt. We find that such protection reduces debtor moral hazard by allowing a bonghokder to improve his position in negotiations with the sovereign. Moreover, equilibrium credit protection does not reduce the efficiency of crisis resolution. We even identify situations where protection facilitates conditionality in crisis resolution. Neverlesless, we show that a bondholder's choice of protection is not always socially optimal. Crisis resolution can then be improved through increasing protection.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherCFAP, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridgeen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCFAP Working Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries23en
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.titleCredit derivatives and sovereign debten
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.type.versionpublished versionen


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