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dc.contributor.authorWard, Jonathan
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-28T13:37:36Z
dc.date.available2010-05-28T13:37:36Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.citationJEL classification: G21, G28, K33en
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/225212
dc.description.abstractThe new Basel Accord framework relies on markets and supervisors to discipline banks. Yet both markets and supervisors fail, and more so in developing countries than in high-income countries. Therefore, the new Accord is not, as its designers claim, suitable for wide application. Nevertheless, developing country policymakers have little choice but to implement it in part or in whole. Hence there are problems of governance in international regulation. I offer seven general principles for the design of a prudential regime more robust to government and market failure. Four alternative capital regimes are evaluated in the light of these principles. Simpler and harsher regimes are likely to achieve greater safety with a given level of resources.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherCFAP, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridgeen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCFAP Working Paperen
dc.relation.ispartofseries04en
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subjectBasel Accorden
dc.subjectBasel 2en
dc.subjectinternational banking lawen
dc.subjectbank regulationen
dc.subjectcapital adequacyen
dc.subjectfinance and developmenten
dc.subjectWorld Trade Organisationen
dc.titleThe new Basel accord and developing countries: problems and alternativesen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.type.versionpublished versionen


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