Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorMak, Vincenten
dc.contributor.authorSeale, Den
dc.contributor.authorRapoport, Aen
dc.contributor.authorGisches, EJen
dc.date.accessioned2018-09-10T22:15:44Z
dc.date.available2018-09-10T22:15:44Z
dc.date.issued2019-09en
dc.identifier.issn1526-5501
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/280028
dc.description.abstractWe propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the “secretary problem,” where collective decisions on when to stop the search are reached via a pre-specified voting rule. We offer a game-theoretic analysis of our model, and then report two experiments on three-person committees with either uncorrelated or perfectly correlated preferences under three different voting rules, followed by a third experiment on single decision makers. Relative to equilibrium predictions, committees with uncorrelated preferences over-searched under minority and majority voting rules, but otherwise under-searched or approximated equilibrium play. Individually, committee members were often less strategic when their preferences were uncorrelated than when they were perfectly correlated. Collectively, committees’ decisions were more strategic than single decision makers’ only under the unanimity rule, though still not significantly better in terms of the decision makers’ welfare. Finally, across our experiments that involved committee search, the unanimity rule always optimized committee welfare.
dc.publisherInstitute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
dc.titleVoting rules in sequential search by committees: theory and experimentsen
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage4450
prism.issueIdentifier9en
prism.publicationDate2019en
prism.publicationNameManagement Scienceen
prism.startingPage3949
prism.volume65en
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.27392
dcterms.dateAccepted2018-06-08en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1287/mnsc.2018.3146en
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-09en
dc.contributor.orcidMak, Vincent [0000-0002-4690-0819]
dc.identifier.eissn1526-5501
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen
cam.issuedOnline2019-04-09en
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2019-09-10


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record