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dc.contributor.authorBennett, Matthew
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-11T00:30:58Z
dc.date.available2018-12-11T00:30:58Z
dc.date.issued2017-12
dc.identifier.issn0966-8373
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/286622
dc.description.abstract© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd Those who have emphasised Nietzsche's naturalism have often claimed that he emulates natural scientific methods by offering causal explanations of psychological, social, and moral phenomena. In order to render Nietzsche's method consistent with his methodology, such readers of Nietzsche have also claimed that his objections to the use of causal explanations are based on a limited scepticism concerning the veracity of causal explanations. My contention is that proponents of this reading are wrong about both Nietzsche's methodology and his method. I argue for this by: first, showing that Nietzsche was suspicious of causal explanations not only on sceptical grounds but also for reasons provided by his psychological analysis of our tendency to look for causes; and second, arguing for a non-causal interpretation of Nietzsche's approach to psychological explanation.
dc.publisherWiley
dc.title‘Pain Always Asks for a Cause’: Nietzsche and Explanation
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage1568
prism.issueIdentifier4
prism.publicationDate2017
prism.publicationNameEuropean Journal of Philosophy
prism.startingPage1550
prism.volume25
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.33934
dcterms.dateAccepted2016-06-12
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1111/ejop.12240
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2017-12-01
dc.contributor.orcidBennett, Matthew [0000-0001-9482-4091]
dc.identifier.eissn1468-0378
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
cam.issuedOnline2017-04-12
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2019-04-12


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