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dc.contributor.authorErdil, Aytek
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-05T00:30:19Z
dc.date.available2019-02-05T00:30:19Z
dc.date.issued2014-05
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/288772
dc.description.abstractI study strategy-proof assignment mechanisms where the agents reveal their preference rankings over the available objects. A stochastic mechanism returns lotteries over deterministic assignments, and mechanisms are compared according to first-order stochastic dominance. I show that non-wasteful strategy-proof mechanisms are not dominated by strategy-proof mechanisms, however non-wastefulness is highly restrictive when the mechanism involves randomization. Infact, the Random Priority mechanism (i.e.,the Random Serial Dictatorship), and a recently adopted school choice mechanism, Deferred Acceptance with Random Tie-breaking, are wasteful. I find that both these mechanisms are dominated by strategy-proof mechanisms. In general, strategy proof improvement cannot be due to merely reshuffling objects, and therefore must involve assigning more objects.
dc.languageen
dc.publisherElsevier BV
dc.titleStrategy-proof stochastic assignment
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage162
prism.publicationDate2014
prism.publicationNameJournal of Economic Theory
prism.startingPage146
prism.volume151
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.36036
dcterms.dateAccepted2013-11-01
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1016/j.jet.2013.11.002
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2014-05
dc.contributor.orcidErdil, Aytek [0000-0002-7916-8871]
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
cam.issuedOnline2013-11-07
rioxxterms.freetoread.startdate2015-11-30


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