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dc.contributor.authorFaraglia, E.
dc.contributor.authorMarcet, A.
dc.contributor.authorOikonomou, R.,
dc.contributor.authorScott, A.
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-05T15:54:15Z
dc.date.available2019-03-05T15:54:15Z
dc.date.issued2019-02-11
dc.identifier.otherCWPE1761
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/290229
dc.description.abstractWe show that under asymetric information, if the government holds advanced information relative to the investors.some debt management policies may lead to bond market instability. The In particular, we show that the repurchase/reissuance strategy assumd in most of the current debt management literature would cause such a crisis and it would be therefore highly suboptimal.of a bond below its maturity this does compromise the ability of long bonds to provide fiscal insurance.
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.titleA Short Note on Optimal Debt Management under Asymmetric Information
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.37456


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