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dc.contributor.authorNewbery, D.
dc.date.accessioned2019-04-26T12:03:30Z
dc.date.available2019-04-26T12:03:30Z
dc.date.issued2017-03-17
dc.identifier.otherCWPE1714
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/292008
dc.description.abstractWell-designed electricity liberalization has delivered efficiency gains, but political risks of decarbonizing the sector have undermined investment incentives in energy-only markets, while poorly designed regulated tariffs have increased the cost of accommodating renewables. The paper sets out principles from theory and public economics to guide market design, capacity remuneration, renewables support and regulatory tariff setting, illustrating their application in a hypothetical high capital cost low variable cost electricity system in "Andia" that resembles Peru. Such characteristics are likely to become more prevalent with increasing renewables penetration, where poor regulation is already threatening current utility business models. The appendix develops and applies a method for determining the subsidy justified by learning spillovers from solar PV.
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subjectElectricity market design
dc.subjecttariffs
dc.subjectrenewables support
dc.subjectutilities
dc.titleWhat future(s) for liberalized electricity markets: efficient, equitable or innovative?
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.39161


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