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dc.contributor.authorWalsh, A. M.
dc.date.accessioned2019-06-28T08:38:20Z
dc.date.available2019-06-28T08:38:20Z
dc.date.issued2019-06-19
dc.identifier.otherCWPE1954
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/294135
dc.description.abstractA set of agents is connected by two distinct networks, with each network describing access to a different local public good. Agents choose which networks to invest in, and neighbouring agents' investments in the same good are strategic substitutes, as are an agent's two investment choices. There are always equilibria where any investing agent bears all local investment costs and others free-ride. When investment in one good reduces marginal benefit from investment in the other, agents free-riding in one good may invest more profitably in the other, and equilibrium payoffs are more evenly distributed. This need not reduce aggregate payoff.
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
dc.subjectMulti-layer networks
dc.subjectnetwork games
dc.subjectpublic goods
dc.titleGames on Multi-Layer Networks
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.41236


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