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dc.contributor.authorGair, J. R
dc.contributor.authorIyer, S.
dc.contributor.authorVelu, C.
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-02T17:23:52Z
dc.date.available2021-03-02T17:23:52Z
dc.date.issued2021-01-04
dc.identifier.otherCWPE2102
dc.identifier.otherC-INET2104
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/318304
dc.description.abstractWe examine a number of probabilistic choice models in which people might form their beliefs to play their strategies in a game theoretic setting in order to propose alternative equilibrium concepts to the Nash equilibrium. In particular, we evaluate the Blavatskyy model, Returns Based Beliefs (RBB) model, Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) model, Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium (BRNE) model and the Utility Proportional Beliefs (UPB) model. We outline the foundational axioms for these models and fully explicate them in terms of probabilistic actions, probabilistic beliefs and their epistemic characterizations. We test the model predictions using empirical data and show which models perform better under which conditions. We also extend the Blavatskyy model which was developed to consider games with two actions to cases where there are three or more actions. We provide a nuanced understanding of how different types of probabilistic choice models might predict better than others.
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge-INET Working Paper Series
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
dc.subjectSubjective Probabilities
dc.subjectDecision Making
dc.subjectCooperation
dc.titleProbabilistic Choice Models
dc.typeWorking Paper
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.65421


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