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dc.contributor.authorArellano, M. Soledaden_GB
dc.date.accessioned2004-06-16T16:05:29Z
dc.date.available2004-06-16T16:05:29Z
dc.date.created2003-05en_GB
dc.date.issued2004-06-16T16:05:29Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/359
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/359
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines generators' incentives to exercise market power and the strategies they would follow if all electricity supplies were traded in an hourly-unregulated spot market. The industry is modelled as a Cournot duopoly with a competitive fringe; particular care is given to the hydro scheduling decision. Quantitative simulations of generators� strategic behaviour indicate that the largest (Endesa) would have the incentive and power to act unilaterally. It would schedule its hydro resources to take advantage of differences in price electricity: too little supply in high demand periods and too much in low demand periods. Two market power mitigation measures are analysed: requiring Endesa to divest some of its generating capacity, and fixed price forward contracts for dominant generators. Conditions for the development of a voluntary contract market are analysed, as it is not practical to relyen_GB
dc.format.extent1032227 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_GB
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subject.classificationClassification-JEL: D43, L11, L13, L94en_GB
dc.subject.otherelectricity utilities, market power, scheduling hydro-reservoirs, contracts, Chile's electricity industryen_GB
dc.titleDiagnosing and Mitigating Market Power in Chile's Electricity Industryen_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5008


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