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dc.contributor.authorSpagnolo, Giancarloen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2004-06-16T16:05:53Z
dc.date.available2004-06-16T16:05:53Z
dc.date.created1999-03en_GB
dc.date.issued2004-06-16T16:05:53Z
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/425
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/425
dc.description.abstractThis paper addresses the effects of multimarket contact on firms� ability to collude. Real world imperfections tend to makes firms� objective function strictly concave and market supergames �interdependent�: firms� payoffs in each market depend on how they are doing in others. Then, multimarket contact always facilitates collusion. It may even make it sustainable in all markets when otherwise it would not be sustainable in any. The effects of conglomeration are discussed. �Multi-game contact� is shown to facilitate cooperation in non-oligopolistic supergames as long as agents� objectives function is submodular in material payoffs.en_GB
dc.format.extent806093 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_GB
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserveden
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/en
dc.subject.classificationClassification-JEL: C72, D43, L13, L21en_GB
dc.subject.otherRepeated games, Oligopoly, Collusion, Cooperation, Conglomeration, Mergersen_GB
dc.titleOn Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusionen_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5187


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