Populists in power: A comparative analysis of the impact of populism on the foreign policy of Italy, Austria, and Hungary

Abstract

As populist forces are increasingly winning elections, this thesis aims at understanding how populists in government influence a nation’s foreign policy. The selected case studies are governments in the European context which have all had populist forces in power: the First Conte government (2018-2019) in Italy, the Kurz I executive (2017-2019) in Austria, and the Orbán governments (2010-2014 and 2014-2018) in Hungary. The doctoral project uses a qualitative methodology and more specifically, the within-case method of process tracing (adopting the analyticist approach by van Meegdenburg). At a higher level of abstraction, and adopting a politico-strategic definition of populism, the thesis elaborates an ideal-type process connecting populism to foreign policy. The impact of populists in power on national foreign policy is felt through three dimensions: concentration of power in populist’s hands; change of the bureaucratic apparatus; politicisation of foreign policy issues. In opposition to this, we see a response from the bureaucratic apparatus to the changes in national foreign policy enacted by populists. There are three dimensions to this reaction: use of rules and procedures to impede implementation; coordination with colleagues; dialogue with populists and institutional figures. To complement the ideal-type process, four factors which can determine the degree of impact of populist forces in governmental positions on national foreign policy can be described: length in power, coalition dynamics, diplomatic corps tradition, and salience of a foreign policy issue. All these claims are explored in detail through three substantive empirical chapters in the thesis, each of which focuses on one of the case studies identified above.