Menstrual shame has been widely targeted in liberal, western societies like the United Kingdom as a social phenomenon which needs to be overcome. Yet, it is not immediately obvious why menstrual shame is a social justice concern, what kind of injustice it constitutes, and what measures should be taken to tackle this injustice. This thesis aims to answer all three concerns, offering a detailed understanding of what menstrual shame is, why it is salient from the perspective of political equality, and which routes feminist activists may take to overcome this injustice.

I start by considering why one might think that menstrual shame is not problematically gendered: menstruation, just like other bodily processes, is something many people simply like to keep private. There may be two justifications for this, I argue: one may think that menstruation is disgusting, or one may think that it is important for a self-composed, social person to keep certain aspects of themselves under control. While both justifications may be construed as only accidentally sexed, rather than problematically gendered, I propose that feminist activists can respond by pointing out the effects of these justifications as well as their prior and sustained ties to gender hierarchies. In particular, the justification via competent self- control subtly reproduces unequal gender hierarchies through connecting menstrual privacy with responsibility and morality.

With this distinction in place, I argue that menstrual shame undermines the self-respect of women and girls, thus constituting an injustice. This injustice can be addressed with different measures: I offer a conceptual map of the vast array of measures proposed in response to menstrual shame, showing what each is committed to and which part of menstrual shame each argues needs mitigation. I close by considering one tool for empowerment which has gained traction recently: menstrual tracking apps. I place these apps within the map drawn over the previous chapters and identify which levers for injustices menstrual tracking apps can help alleviate, which they leave untouched, and which kinds of injustices they may, in fact, perpetuate. In summary, I show that menstrual privacy is unjust because women are expected to meet demanding and often impossible ideals of privacy as the managers of their body, proving they can be accepted as good social interactors. I argue for a comprehensive approach to menstrual empowerment which takes seriously women’s individual needs and structural criticism.