Targeted Sanctions and Sovereignty in Zimbabwe

Abstract

The emergence of targeted sanctions marked a moment of global optimism, wherein leaders who defied ‘acceptable’ international norms and other transgressors could face consequences, while at the same time shielding vulnerable populations from these consequences. This novel approach to sanctions offered policymakers an alternative instrument to comprehensive sanctions, grounded in the belief that it was feasible to separate targeted individuals from the broader populace. Having experienced both comprehensive and targeted sanctions, Zimbabwe serves as fertile ground to interrogate the assumptions underpinning the targeted sanctions framework. Drawing upon Zimbabwe’s intricate political history, this dissertation contends that the philosophical and political foundations of targeted sanctions are deeply flawed. By employing three theoretical frameworks: the Social Conflict Analysis (SCA), Political Marketplace Framework (PMF), and the Normative Popular Sovereignty (NPS) framework, this thesis advances three key arguments. From a political sociological perspective, I contend that the imposition of targeted sanctions is rooted in a misinterpretation of political dynamics. This misconception arises from the assumption made by those imposing targeted sanctions that there exists a significant divide between the targets of sanctions and the general population. I argue that this oversimplification overlooks the nuanced interplay of social forces within a political context. The argument posited here is that politics should be comprehended as a delicate equilibrium of competing social forces, wherein any disruption to one aspect inevitably impacts others within the state, including its citizens. I argue that the leaders of the Zimbabwean government who, for the most part have been targets of sanctions, are deeply embedded in the political economy of Zimbabwe. As such, by targeting these people or the entities they control, senders are inadvertently targeting the ordinary citizens. Building on these arguments, I conclude by demonstrating via an analysis of popular sovereignty in the context of Zimbabwe, that all targeted sanctions achieve, is to threaten democratic popular sovereignty and, by implication, the control that citizens ought to have over their representatives in order to maintain their accountability.