Repository logo
 

Policy Compromises: Corruption and Regulation in a Dynamic Democracy

Simple item page
dc.contributor.authorAidt, Toke S.
dc.date.accessioned2004-06-16T16:05:38Z
dc.date.available2004-06-16T16:05:38Z
dc.date.created2004-01en_GB
dc.date.issued2004-06-16T16:05:38Z
dc.description.abstractThis paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with political corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalisation implies free entry and allocative efficiency and is supported by a majority of voters. Voters reelect politicians based on observed performance. We study Markov-perfect equilibria of the resulting game, and demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate some corruption and inefficient regulation in political equilibrium. Efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth. Political corruption entails excessive stabilization of aggregate fluctuations.
dc.format.extent348100 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen_GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5353
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/383
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
dc.subject.classificationClassification-JEL: D72, K42, O41
dc.subject.otherCorruption, performance voting, economic growth.
dc.titlePolicy Compromises: Corruption and Regulation in a Dynamic Democracy
dc.typeWorking Paper
rioxxterms.versionAO

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
cwpe0404.pdf
Size:
339.94 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Licence
https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
Download

Collections

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics (CWPE)