Giving myself a law nietzsche, self-respect, and the problem with kant's universalism

dc.contributor.author	Bennett, M
dc.contributor.orcid	Bennett, Matthew [0000-0001-9482-4091]
dc.date.accessioned	2018-12-12T00:31:26Z
dc.date.available	2018-12-12T00:31:26Z
dc.date.issued	2018-08-01
dc.description.abstract	© 2018 Societa Editrice il Mulino. All Rights Reserved. This paper offers a new interpretation of Nietzsche's criticisms of Kant's account of freedom and renders these criticisms in such a way as to pose a serious challenge to Kantian ethics. My first aim is to explain Nietzsche's challenge to the principle that being free means acting as a free agent ought to act, which I call Kant's universalism. My second aim is to show that Kant's accounts of selfrespect is a particularly unconvincing account of how we can make room for virtues within a universalistic framework, and thereby persuade the Kantian that there is something wrong with the underlying universalism principle.
dc.identifier.doi	10.17863/CAM.34022
dc.identifier.issn	1122-7893
dc.identifier.uri	https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/286715
dc.publisher	Il Mulino publishing house
dc.title	Giving myself a law nietzsche, self-respect, and the problem with kant's universalism
dc.type	Article
dcterms.dateAccepted	2018-05-12
prism.issueIdentifier	84
prism.publicationDate	2018
prism.publicationName	Iride
prism.volume	31
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate	2018-08-01
rioxxterms.licenseref.uri	http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
rioxxterms.type	Journal Article/Review
rioxxterms.version	AM
rioxxterms.versionofrecord	10.1414/91133

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