Inquiring to Understand: Essays on How We Make Sense of the World

Abstract

The desire for understanding lies at the centre of our lives. We don’t just desire trivia-like information about the world; we desire deep and systematic familiarity with it. Yet what does it mean to understand something, how is that different from merely knowing it? This dissertation develops a novel account of understanding that accounts for its unique properties, social embeddedness, and distinct value. I argue that standard approaches—treating understanding as a kind of knowledge, a static grasp of explanations, or an ability—fail to account for how we come to understand, communicate understanding, or pursue it together with others. My central claim is that understanding is a generative process of making sense: it involves building conceptions that structure and organise information in ways that are sensitive to context, purpose, and interpretive goals. The first chapter, ‘Noetic Understanding’, introduces this novel account. I show that understanding depends not just on what we know, but on how our conceptual and attentional frameworks are shaped—what we notice, connect, and prioritise. In ‘Inquiring to Understand’, I argue that inquiry aimed at understanding is not reducible to knowledge acquisition. It is a constructive process that often involves coining new concepts, shifting interpretive lenses, and making phenomena intelligible. ‘Communicating Understanding’ explores how understanding is shared. I argue that unlike knowledge, understanding cannot be transmitted through testimony alone; it requires collaborative effort to construct and convey perspectives, often through metaphor, narrative, and visual representation. The final chapter, ‘Thinking Together’, develops an account of shared understanding. In joint inquiry participants depend on one another not just for information. Instead, I develop and defend an account of thinking together based on the sharing and coordination of perspectives. I argue that thinking together does not require convergence on beliefs—it is an open ended-process of attunement and calibration. I show how this activity is constitutively interpersonal and valuable.