Tactical Control or Bureaucratic Tactics? An Analysis of Checks and Controls on Local, Hybrid, and Substate Forces in US Foreign Policy

Abstract

This thesis explores how the decision to try to mitigate risks when working with non-state, substate, or other more irregular armed groups might affect the decision to engage with these groups. It does so by examining nine case studies of US partnerships with local, hybrid, and substate forces (LHSFs) in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria from 2005 to 2019. The risk mitigation mechanisms that emerged in these US-LHSF relationships typify the sort of control mechanisms that Principal-Agent theory assumes patrons will deploy to better control or constrain agents. However, in many situations, these control mechanisms appeared to be driven more by political bargaining between different actors in the policy-making process, or as the result of bureaucratic protocols, elements that are more central to Bureaucratic or Foreign Policy Analysis. Analysis of these US-LHSF relationships from these two lenses offers theoretical contributions to both analytical models: it adds nuance to our understanding of how Principal-Agent theories might devolve within these non-state or irregular force partnerships, and some of the limitations of those theories, while also expanding the type of bargaining situations and bargaining players that might be analyzed under Bureaucratic Policy Analysis. The conclusion blends insights from both lenses to understand what might underlie this emerging trend toward regulating irregular actors, and also to more broadly understand how states respond to the risks surrounding non-state or substate actors within hybrid or complex security landscapes.