Since the 2010-2011 uprisings, several Arab countries have witnessed considerable reconfiguration of their market for force. Alongside continuous reshuffle and reform schemes affecting the public security institutions, the market for force has experienced a notable expansion of the private security industry, initially in the private sector and increasingly through an expanding outsourcing process.

Acknowledging the enduring centrality of the security institutions to state power and regime stability in the Arab region, this research explores how increased privatization and outsourcing of security, amid wider reconfigurations of the market for force, has contributed to the reconfiguration of state power in some of the Arab region’s security states since the 2010-2011 uprisings. Particularly, how has the outlined phenomenon impacted internal regime structure and state-society relations?

This enquiry is pursued in two case studies: Egypt and Tunisia. Unlike other Arab countries equally affected by the uprisings, Egypt and Tunisia experienced a quick change in leadership followed by a relatively stable transitional period. Despite their distinct histories and divergent post-uprisings political development, both countries share a long history of being prominent security states. The considerable historical and contemporary similarities between both countries offer rich grounds for comparative analysis while the particularities of each case present unique elements of analysis and grounds to draw different conclusions to test in other cases.

Drawing upon interviews, official documents and fieldwork, the study argues that the post-uprisings reconfiguration of the market for force, amid intensifying security threats and persisting popular unrest, fits into an ongoing framework of authoritarian adaption pursued by the Arab region’s ruling regimes to ensure their survival and prosperity following the 2010-2011 uprisings. Beyond its roots in neo-liberal governance, this phenomenon effectively serves to enhance regime security by providing alternative agents and strategies for social control while offering new venues to expand regime interests through networks of patronage that nurture broad-based authoritarian coalitions and attach the interests of diverse social groups to regime survival.