Should Merchant Transmission Investment be Subject to a Must-offer Provision?
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Brunekreeft, G., & Newbery, D. (2006). Should Merchant Transmission Investment be Subject to a Must-offer Provision?. http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/131601
Merchant electricity transmission investment is a practically relevant example of an unregulated investment with monopoly properties. However, while leaving the investment decision to the market, the regulator may decide to prohibit capacity withholding with a must-offer provision. This paper examines the welfare effects of a must-offer provision prior to the capacity choice, given three reasons for capacity withholding: uncertainty, demand growth and pre-emptive investment. A must-offer provision will decrease welfare in the first two cases, and can enhance welfare only in the last case. In the presence of importer market power, a regulatory test might be needed.
Classification-JEL: L51, L94, L4, investment, must-offer, capacity withholding, regulation, electricity
This record's DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5476