On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly
De Sinopoli, Francesco
Faculty of Economics
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De Sinopoli, F., & Iannantuoni, G. (2006). On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5466
Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which ‘similar’ voters make ‘similar’ voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly pluralityvoting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria.
Classification-JEL: C72, D72., Strategic Voting, Symmetric Equilibria
This record's DOI: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5466