A THEORY OF THE CORRUPT KEYNESIAN

Aidt, TS; Dutta, J

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Authors

Aidt, TS

Dutta, J

Editors

Dutta, B

Ray, T

Somanathan, E

Publication Date

2009

Series

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

ISBN

9812839410

978-981-283-941-1

Publisher

Faculty of Economics

Volume

Pages

93-111

Type

Working Paper

Metadata

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Citation

Aidt, T., & Dutta, J. (2009). A THEORY OF THE CORRUPT KEYNESIAN. 5 93-111. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5315

Abstract

AbstractWe evaluate the impact of real business cycle shocks on corruption and economic policy in a model of entry regulation in a representative democracy. We find that corruption is pro-cyclical and regulation policy is counter-cyclical. Corrupt politicians engage in excessive stabilization of aggregate fluctuations and behave as if they were Keynesian. We also find that business cycle shocks can induce political instability with politicians losing office in recessions.

Keywords

Corruption, entry regulation, performance voting, business cycles, GROWTH, PERSISTENCE

Identifiers

CWPE0861

External DOI: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.5315

This record's URL: http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/229406 https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/229406

Rights

Licence URL: https://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/

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