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dc.contributor.authorAidt, TS
dc.contributor.authorDutta, J
dc.contributor.editorDutta, B
dc.contributor.editorRay, T
dc.contributor.editorSomanathan, E
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-07T11:31:33Z
dc.date.available2011-01-07T11:31:33Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.isbn9812839410
dc.identifier.isbn978-981-283-941-1
dc.identifier.otherCWPE0861
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/229406
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/229406
dc.description.abstractAbstractWe evaluate the impact of real business cycle shocks on corruption and economic policy in a model of entry regulation in a representative democracy. We find that corruption is pro-cyclical and regulation policy is counter-cyclical. Corrupt politicians engage in excessive stabilization of aggregate fluctuations and behave as if they were Keynesian. We also find that business cycle shocks can induce political instability with politicians losing office in recessions.
dc.publisherFaculty of Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCambridge Working Papers in Economics
dc.rightsAll Rights Reserved
dc.rights.urihttps://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved/
dc.subjectCorruption
dc.subjectentry regulation
dc.subjectperformance voting
dc.subjectbusiness cycles
dc.subjectGROWTH
dc.subjectPERSISTENCE
dc.titleA THEORY OF THE CORRUPT KEYNESIAN
dc.typeWorking Paper
prism.endingPage111
prism.startingPage93
prism.volume5
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.5315
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.17863/CAM.5315
dc.contributor.orcidAidt, Toke [0000-0002-8319-6568]
dcterms.isPartOfNew and Enduring Themes in Development Economics


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