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dc.contributor.authorRecchia, Stefanoen
dc.date.accessioned2015-06-24T13:38:34Z
dc.date.available2015-06-24T13:38:34Z
dc.date.issued2015-07-21en
dc.identifier.citationRecchia. International Relations (2016), 30(1), pp. 78-101. doi: 10.1177/0047117815593137en
dc.identifier.issn0047-1178
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/248673
dc.description.abstractWhat motivates the United States, the world’s most powerful country, to seek multilateral approval from the United Nations or NATO for its military interventions? Drawing on interviews with top-level US policymakers and combining process tracing with a structured-focused comparison of several cases, this article reveals that American leaders do not value multilateral approval primarily to avert negative issue linkage, or ‘soft balancing’ in other policy domains. Instead, they are motivated by narrower concerns. Their main goal is to facilitate sustained military and financial burden sharing on the prospective intervention, in the expectation that this will assuage congressional concerns about resource costs, reducing the risk that Congress might withdraw its support once American troops are deployed. The article therefore demonstrates that (1) US policymakers worry less about issue linkage than many International Relations theorists, as policymakers are confident that overall, US power inclines other countries to bandwagon with the United States, and (2) contrary to widespread belief, executive-branch concerns about congressional opposition do significantly influence US military intervention decision-making.
dc.languageEnglishen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSAGE Publications
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial 2.0 UK: England & Wales*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/uk/*
dc.subjectmultilateralismen
dc.subjectUnited Nationsen
dc.subjectmilitary interventionen
dc.subjectsoft balancingen
dc.subjectburden sharingen
dc.titleWhy seek international organisation approval under unipolarity? Averting issue linkage vs. appeasing Congressen
dc.typeArticle
dc.description.versionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from SAGE Publications via http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117815593137en
prism.endingPage101
prism.publicationDate2015en
prism.publicationNameInternational Relationsen
prism.startingPage78
prism.volume30en
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1177/0047117815593137en
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2015-07-21en
dc.contributor.orcidRecchia, Stefano [0000-0002-5470-6311]
dc.identifier.eissn1741-2862
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen


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Attribution-NonCommercial 2.0 UK: England & Wales
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as Attribution-NonCommercial 2.0 UK: England & Wales