Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
Faculty of Economics
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Aidt, T., & Shvets, J. (2011). Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures. https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.1178
We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage individual legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less state funds to their district when they cannot run for re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this tendency is less pronounced in states with many legislative districts.
Term limits, electoral incentives, distributive politics, the Law of 1/N, US state legislatures.
This record's DOI: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.1178
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/257250
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