Let us suppose that God commands all and only those actions that are obligatory, and prohibits all and only those actions that are wrong. We then face questions. Does God command the obligatory because it is obligatory? If so, then why pay attention to God’s commands? Why not look rather to the real source of obligatoriness? Or is it instead that the obligatory is obligatory because commanded by God? If so, then would something else have been obligatory if God had commanded otherwise? And why bother with putative obligations created and variable at whim? Or again, are wrong actions wrong because God prohibits them, or does God prohibit them because they are wrong? Whether God prohibits things for some reason or for no reason, either way, how can his prohibition have, in itself, any weight at all? Such questions are often named ‘the Euthyphro Problem’, or even ‘the Euthyphro Dilemma’.