The Argument from Surprise
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Taylor & Francis
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Currie, A. (2018). The Argument from Surprise. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48 (5), 639-661. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1368860
I develop an account of productive surprise as an epistemic virtue of scientific investigations which does not turn on psychology alone. On my account, a scientific investigation is potentially productively surprising when (1) results can conflict with epistemic expectations, (2) those expectations pertain to a wide set of subjects. I argue that there are two sources of such surprise in science. One source, often identified with experiments, involves bringing our theoretical ideas in contact with new empirical observations. Another, often identified with simulations, involves articulating and bringing together different parts of our knowledge. Both experiments and simulations, then, can surprise.
Some of the research for this publication was made possible through the support of a grant from Templeton World Charity Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Templeton World Charity Foundation.
Templeton World Charity Foundation (TWCF) (177155)
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1368860
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/270126