Faculty of Philosophy
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Faculty of Philosophy
Cambridge has occupied a uniquely distinguished place in the history of philosophy in the last 100 years. It was here in the early years of the 20th century, that Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, Ramsey and others developed the analytic style of philosophy which is now prominent in much of the world. The Faculty of Philosophy today retains a strong commitment to this analytic tradition, combining it with study and teaching of the history of philosophy from Plato to the present day, as well as aesthetics and political philosophy.
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Faculty of Philosophy Events Posters
Faculty of Philosophy Events Posters
Recent Submissions
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Permanent Underdetermination from Approximate Empirical Equivalence in Field Theory: Massless and Massive Scalar Gravity, Neutrino, Electromagnetic, Yang–Mills and Gravitational Theories
(Oxford University Press, 2010-11-19)Classical and quantum field theory provide not only realistic examples of extant notions of empirical equivalence, but also new notions of empirical equivalence, both modal and occurrent. A simple but modern gravitational ... -
How to make money: Distributive justice, finance, and monetary constitutions
(2018-04-28)A capitalist society has two defining features. The first is well-known. A capitalist economy leaves coordination of exchange and production largely to private authority. The dissertation investigates a second feature. In ... -
A simpler and more realistic subjective decision theory
(Springer Nature, 2017-11-16)In his classic book Savage develops a formal system of rational decision making. It is based on (i) a set of possible states of the world, (ii) a set of consequences, (iii) a set of acts, which are functions from states ... -
Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh
(2017-12)We respond to Conor McHugh's claim that an evaluative account of the normative relation between belief and truth is preferable to a prescriptive account. We claim that his arguments fail to establish this. We then draw a ...
