Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh
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Publication Date
2017-12Journal Title
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
ISSN
0279-0750
Volume
98
Pages
128-145
Language
en
Type
Article
This Version
AM
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Greenberg, A., & Cowie, C. (2017). Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 98 128-145. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12158
Abstract
We respond to Conor McHugh's claim that an evaluative account of the normative relation between belief and truth is preferable to a prescriptive account. We claim that his arguments fail to establish this. We then draw a more general sceptical conclusion: we take our arguments to put pressure on any attempt to show that an evaluative account will fare better than a prescriptive account. We briefly express scepticism about whether McHugh's more recent ‘fitting attitude’ account fares better.
Sponsorship
This work (Alexander Greenberg's contribution) was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (award no: BGP DOCT 2011 AH/J500094/1)
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12158
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/274573
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