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dc.contributor.authorLarcom, Shaun
dc.contributor.authorSarr, Mare
dc.date.accessioned2018-05-25T15:05:30Z
dc.date.available2018-05-25T15:05:30Z
dc.date.issued2018-06
dc.identifier.issn0047-2530
dc.identifier.urihttps://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/276226
dc.description.abstractFor some crimes the perpetrator can be detected costlessly but can only be apprehended at significant cost, or not at all for some period of time. To deter strategic behavior in the period between detection and apprehension, authorities may wish to commit themselves to punishing the criminal once apprehended, regardless of the perpetrator’s behavior or threats. However we show that such efforts at commitment to ex post punishment may induce worse behavior and that it selects potential criminals of a worse type. We show that when law enforcement authorities cannot commit themselves perfectly, it is dangerous for them to try to commit as it may invoke a strategic response that can worsen the situation. When law enforcement authorities do increase their commitment to punish such offenders, it is likely to lead to less but more gruesome crimes.
dc.description.sponsorshipMare Sarr gratefully acknowledges financial support from the South African National Research Foundation (NRF).
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Press
dc.subjectmarginal deterrence
dc.subjectcommitment
dc.subjectkidnapping
dc.subjectinternational criminal court
dc.subjectamnesty
dc.subjectimpunity
dc.subjectsignaling
dc.titleOn the perils of commitment to punishment when criminals are strategic
dc.typeArticle
prism.endingPage418
prism.issueIdentifier2
prism.publicationNameThe Journal of Legal Studies (Chicago)
prism.startingPage391
prism.volume42
dc.identifier.doi10.17863/CAM.23508
dcterms.dateAccepted2018-04-03
rioxxterms.versionofrecord10.1086/698458
rioxxterms.versionAM
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2018-04-03
dc.contributor.orcidLarcom, Shaun [0000-0003-0029-3264]
dc.identifier.eissn1537-5366
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Review
cam.issuedOnline2018-06
cam.orpheus.counter17


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