The correlation argument for reductionism
Accepted version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Clarke, Christopher https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6225-0115
Abstract
jats:pReductionists say things like all mental properties are physical properties; all normative properties are natural properties. I argue that the only way to resist reductionism is to deny that causation is difference making (thus making the epistemology of causation a mystery) or to deny that properties are individuated by their causal powers (thus making properties a mystery); that is to say, unless one is happy to deny supervenience or to trivialize the debate over reductionism. To show this, I argue that if properties are individuated by their causal powers, then, surprisingly, properties are individuated by necessary coexemplification.</jats:p>
Description
Keywords
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields
Journal Title
Philosophy of Science
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0031-8248
1539-767X
1539-767X
Volume Title
86
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Publisher DOI
Sponsorship
European Research Council (715530)