"Logic is a geometry of thinking". Space and Spatial Frameworks in Wittgenstein's Writings
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Authors
Advisors
Chang, Hasok
Date
2019-11-30Awarding Institution
University of Cambridge
Author Affiliation
History and Philosophy of Science
Qualification
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Language
English
Type
Thesis
Metadata
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Zambito, P. F. (2019). "Logic is a geometry of thinking". Space and Spatial Frameworks in Wittgenstein's Writings (Doctoral thesis). https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.46074
Abstract
The thesis investigates the history and functions of space concepts in Wittgenstein’s
philosophy. It is based on a Kantian account which conceives of space not as a thing, but as
an a priori framework which constitutes possibilities, not facts. The increasing abstraction
and formalisation of geometry in the 19th century enabled Wittgenstein in his Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus to extend this formal account and to devise his concept of “logical
space” as a universal and necessary manifold for all meaningful states-of-affairs. After his
return to philosophy in 1929, he holds up the idea that necessity is not an extraordinary
fact, but a feature of the logical framework which constitutes possibilities. Unlike in the
Tractatus, however, he then speaks of spaces in the plural and highlights the differences
between different “geometries” or “grammars”. I emphasise the plurality of Wittgenstein’s
later space concept by presenting the various fields in which spatial terminology is used, as
well as the similarity of these various instances by pointing out commonalities in the way in
which they are used: the emphasis on possibility instead of truth, the distinction between
“geometry” and “physics”(between logic and experience), but also the distinction between
different kinds of geometries. These similarities allow me to recognise a number of concepts
as closely connected to “space” – and thereby to one another – instead of highlighting
their differences. Against views which argue for the complete disappearance of spaces
and grammar in the late Wittgenstein’s philosophy, I suggest that these concepts are not
dismissed, but transformed after the middle period. The reasons for this transformation are
the increasing importance of time, notably the change from static spaces to more dynamic
frameworks, and the acknowledgement of empirical factors in logic: instead of an ontological
separation of logic and experience it makes more sense to speak of different grammatical
roles.
Keywords
Wittgenstein, History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Space
Sponsorship
The thesis has been supported by the AHRC DTP (Fees only Award for EU-students) and the Vice Chancellor's Awards of the Cambridge Trust
Identifiers
This record's DOI: https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.46074
Rights
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