The problem of evil is one of the most powerful objections to perfect being theism, according to which, God is conceptualized as the personal omnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipotent God. Certain versions of this problem, as developed in recent decades in Anglophone philosophy of religion, pertain to Hindu traditions such as Vaiṣṇavism. However, relatively little attention has been paid to the theological insights of A.C. Bhaktivedanta Swami Prabhupāda (1896-1977), who is an influential guru within the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition and whose teachings provide responses to this problem. In this dissertation, I address this scholarly lacuna by examining Prabhupāda’s lectures, conversations, and exegetical writings in order to reconstruct his theodicy and develop my own theodicy (which builds on that of Prabhupāda) and illustrate its relevance for contemporary discourses within Anglophone philosophy of religion.

More specifically, I discuss William Rowe’s evidential argument from evil and demonstrate that the theodicy that I develop can account for the existence of the types of horrendous evil that Rowe describes. Throughout the dissertation, I examine various objections to the karman doctrine that is a core component of my theodicy. I conclude that my theodicy can provide a compelling response to Rowe’s evidential argument from evil. I also illustrate how this theodicy can respond to some other formulations of the problem of evil, such as those advanced by Paul Draper. Given the specific word count, I do not comprehensively analyze such formulations. However, I seek to pave for further exploration in subsequent work.

I now offer a brief summary of my dissertation. In chapter 1, I explicate the problem of evil and some of its variants. Next, I provide some background information about the Caitanya Vaiṣṇava tradition as well as Prabhupāda’s life and work. I also survey various responses to the problem of evil, both within and outside Hindu thought.

In chapter 2, I lay the conceptual foundations for the dissertation by describing how God, selves, and free will are conceived within Prabhupāda’s theological framework. I argue that Prabhupāda’s conceives of God as being all-good, all-powerful, and all-knowing. I maintain that selves in Prabhupāda’s conceptual framework are free, according to a definition of freedom that I put forth and develop. I also establish a moral ontology that defines the highest good as divine love of God.

In chapter 3, I begin to reconstruct Prabhupāda’s theodicy by outlining the root cause of suffering according to Prabhupāda, namely, the finite self’s decision to freely leave the company of God in a supramundane realm that lies beyond this physical world. I examine and bolster Prabhupāda’s defense of this view, which is that a world where selves are endowed with free will, even at the risk of misusing it, is better than a world where selves lack such volitional capacity. I also respond to a variety of other arguments against free will theodicies, such as those recently put forth by Laura Ekstrom.

In chapter 4, I then turn my attention to reconstructing Prabhupāda’ karman doctrine and discuss various soteriological implications of this doctrine. I defend its coherence of this doctrine against various objections, including James Sterba’s objection against free will theodicies. Moreover, I discuss why God does not override karmic mechanisms.

In chapter 5, I address various objections to a karman doctrine, such as those recently advanced by Whitley Kaufman. For instance, I demonstrate how karmic mechanisms can serve a soteriologically beneficial purpose even when individuals do not recall the actions in the past that have led to their experience of karmic consequences. I also argue that karmic mechanisms do not threaten moral responsibility nor undermine free will.

In chapter 6, I describe why, according to Prabhupāda, some devotees of God suffer even though various scriptural passages state that devotees are no longer under the influence of karmic mechanisms. In short, Prabhupāda holds that God consciously orchestrates such instances of suffering for devotees in order for them to learn various soul-making lessons. I also respond to various other objections such as: “why does God not make God’s presence felt when individuals are undergoing suffering?”

In chapter 7, I summarize the major themes discussed in previous chapters. I also explain the significance of my theodicy in the light of some contemporary Anglophone philosophical discourses surrounding the problem of evil.