Repository logo

Reconciling the opposing effects of neurobiological evidence on criminal sentencing judgments.

Published version



Change log


Vold, KV 
Allen, Corey 
Felson, Gidon 
Blumenthal-Barby, Jennifer 
Aharoni, Eyal 


Legal theorists have characterized physical evidence of brain dysfunction as a double-edged sword, wherein the very quality that reduces the defendant’s responsibility for his transgression could simultaneously increase motivations to punish him by virtue of his apparently increased dangerousness. However, empirical evidence of this pattern has been elusive, perhaps owing to a heavy reliance on singular measures that fail to distinguish between plural, often competing internal motivations for punishment. The present study employed a test of the theorized double-edge pattern using a novel approach designed to separate such motivations. We asked a large sample of participants (N = 330) to render criminal sentencing judgments under varying conditions of the defendant’s mental health status (Healthy, Neurobiological Disorder, Psychological Disorder) and the disorder’s treatability (Treatable, Untreatable). As predicted, neurobiological evidence simultaneously elicited shorter prison sentences (i.e., mitigating) and longer terms of involuntary hospitalization (i.e., aggravating) than equivalent psychological evidence. However, these effects were not well explained by motivations to restore treatable defendants to health or to protect society from dangerous persons but instead by deontological motivations pertaining to the defendant’s level of deservingness and possible obligation to provide medical care. This is the first study of its kind to quantitatively demonstrate the paradoxical effect of neuroscientific trial evidence and raises implications for how such evidence is presented and evaluated.



Adult, Criminals, Female, Hospitalization, Humans, Judgment, Male, Mental Health, Neurobiology, Prisons, Punishment, Regression Analysis

Journal Title


Conference Name

Journal ISSN


Volume Title



Public Library of Science (PLoS)
This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation via the Summer Seminars on Neuroscience and Philosophy at Duke University.