Easy Ontology, quantification, and realism
Published version
Peer-reviewed
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Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Marschall, Benjamin
Abstract
Amie Thomasson has defended a view called Easy Ontology, according to which most ontological questions can be answered straightforwardly using conceptual truths and empirical knowledge. Furthermore, she claims that this deflationary meta-ontology does not commit her to any form of anti-realism. In this paper I identify a problem with Thomasson’s account of quantification, according to which everything we quantify over falls under a sortal. Thomasson’s defence of the easiness of answering ontological questions relies on a certain thesis about the hierarchical order of sortals, but the case for the compatibility of Easy Ontology and realism suggests that this thesis is actually false.
Description
Keywords
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields
Journal Title
Synthese
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0039-7857
1573-0964
1573-0964
Volume Title
Publisher
Springer Nature
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Sponsorship
My research was supported by a studentship from the Arts and Humanities Research Council and a scholarship from the Cambridge Trust.