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Equal opportunities in newcomb's problem and elsewhere

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

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Type

Article

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Abstract

jats:titleAbstract</jats:title> jats:pThe paper discusses Ian Wells’s recent argument (Wells 2019) that there is a decision problem in which followers of Evidential Decision Theory end up poorer than followers of Causal Decision Theory despite having the same opportunities for money. It defends Evidential Decision Theory against Wells’s argument, on the following grounds. (i) Wells's has not presented a decision problem in which his main claim is true. (ii) Four possible decision problems can be generated from his central example, in each of which followers of Evidential Decision Theory do at least as well as followers of Causal Decision Theory (but the former typically have better opportunities for money). (iii) There is another case in which followers of Causal Decision Theory have the same opportunities for making money but end up worse than followers of Evidential Decision Theory.</jats:p>

Description

Keywords

5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies

Journal Title

Mind

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0026-4423
1460-2113

Volume Title

129

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)

Rights

All rights reserved
Sponsorship
Leverhulme Trust (RF-2018-231\10)
Leverhulme Trust