Merit for Political Power: The Normative Basis

Abstract

When does someone merit political power, and why? This question intersects with our political reality and various influential arguments for and against democratic arrangements. For instance, one Madisonian argument for democracy is that it serves to select political decisionmakers who merit their power. Against this view, the political meritocrats argue in recent years that democratic elections should be supplemented if not replaced by non-electoral mechanisms, such as examinations and peer recommendations, for assessing people’s merit for public office. In everyday politics, many political roles allowing one to exercise power are also distributed according to merit. This article explores several responses to that question and defends the Macro-Aristotelian View of merit. According to that view, someone can merit political power even if she lacks the qualities that we typically associate with competent and virtuous citizens or leaders, insofar as the characteristic function of power (i.e. justice realisation) will be served better when she has power.