The Gender Gap in Household Bargaining Power: A Revealed-Preference Approach

Abstract When members of the same household have different risk preferences, whose preference matters more for investment decisions and why? We propose an intrahousehold model that aggregates individual preferences at the household level as a result of bargaining. We structurally estimate the model, analyze the determinants of bargaining power, and find a significant gender gap. Gender differences in individual characteristics, as well as gender effects, partially explain the gap. These patterns hold broadly across Australia, Germany, and the United States. We further link the distribution of bargaining power to households’ perceived gender norms in a cross-sectional analysis. (JEL G11, G41, G50)

Keywords

38 Economics, 3801 Applied Economics, 35 Commerce, Management, Tourism and Services, 5 Gender Equality

Journal Title

Review of Financial Studies

Journal ISSN

0893-9454
1465-7368

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)

Publisher DOI

https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhae039

Rights and licensing

Except where otherwised noted, this item's license is described as Attribution 4.0 International

Sponsorship

British Academy (SRG1920\101488)

the British Academy (Grant SRG1920\101488) and the Keynes Fund at Cambridge for financial support. Also support from Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance (CERF).

Collections

University of Cambridge Research Outputs (Articles and Conferences)