On Blaming and Punishing Psychopaths
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Authors
Godman, M
Jefferson, A
Publication Date
2017-03Journal Title
Criminal Law and Philosophy
ISSN
1871-9791
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Language
English
Type
Article
Metadata
Show full item recordCitation
Godman, M., & Jefferson, A. (2017). On Blaming and Punishing Psychopaths. Criminal Law and Philosophy https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-014-9340-3
Description
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-014-9340-3
Abstract
Current legal practice holds that a diagnosis of psychopathy does not remove criminal responsibility. In contrast, many philosophers and legal experts are increasingly persuaded by evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience indicating moral and cognitive deficits in psychopaths and have argued that they should be excused from moral responsibility. However, having opposite views concerning psychopaths’ moral responsibility, on the one hand, and criminal responsibility, on the other, seems unfortunate given the assumption that the law should, at least to some extent, react to the same desert-based considerations as do ascriptions of moral responsibility. In response, Stephen Morse has argued that the law should indeed be reformed so as to excuse those with severe psychopathy from blame, but that psychopaths who have committed criminal offences should still be subject to some legal repercussions such as civil commitment. We argue that consequentialist and norm-expressivist considerations analogous to those that support punishing psychopaths, or at least retaining some legal liability, might also be drawn on in favour of holding psychopaths morally accountable.
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-014-9340-3
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/246056
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