Interaction, protection and epidemics
Journal of Public Economics
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Goyal, S., & Vigier, A. (2015). Interaction, protection and epidemics. Journal of Public Economics, 125 64-69. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.02.010
Individuals respond to the risk of contagious infections by restricting interaction and by investing in protection. We develop a model that examines the trade-off between these two actions and the consequences for infection rates. There exists a unique equilibrium: individuals who invest in protection choose to interact more relative to those who do not invest in protection. Changes in the contagiousness of the disease have non-monotonic effects: as a result interaction initially falls and then rises, while infection rates too may initial increase and then decline. We then consider a society with two communities that differ in their returns from interaction — High and Low. Individuals in isolated communities exhibit different behavior: the High community has a higher rate of protection and interaction, and a lower rate of infection. Integration amplifies these differences.
Social interaction, Epidemics, Vaccination
Sanjeev Goyal thanks the Keynes Fellowship and the Cambridge-INET Institute for financial support. Adrien Vigier thanks the Gates Cambridge Fellowship for its financial support.
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.02.010
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/247683
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0 UK: England & Wales
Licence URL: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/uk/
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