The role of institutional investors in voting: evidence from the securities lending market
View / Open Files
Publication Date
2015-10Journal Title
The Journal of Finance
ISSN
0022-1082
Publisher
Wiley
Volume
70
Issue
5
Pages
2309-2346
Language
English
Type
Article
Metadata
Show full item recordCitation
Aggarwal, P., Saffi, P., & Sturgess, J. (2015). The role of institutional investors in voting: evidence from the securities lending market. The Journal of Finance, 70 (5), 2309-2346. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12284
Abstract
This paper investigates voting preferences of institutional investors using the unique setting of the securities lending market. Investors restrict lendable supply and/or recall loaned shares prior to the proxy record date to exercise voting rights. Recall is higher for investors with greater incentives to monitor, for firms with poor performance or weak governance, and for proposals where returns to governance are likely higher. At the subsequent vote, recall is associated with less support for management and more support for shareholder proposals. Our results indicate that institutions value their vote and use the proxy process to affect corporate governance.
Relationships
Related research output: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2023480
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12284
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/247728
Rights
Licence:
http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved
Statistics