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MacBride on truth in truthmaking

Accepted version
Peer-reviewed

Repository DOI


Type

Article

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Authors

Simpson, Matthew 

Abstract

Fraser MacBride has argued that deflationism about truth makes the truthmaker principle, that every truth has a truthmaker, implausible. This is because on a deflationary view, the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of a conjunction of claims which have no independent motivation. In this article, I argue that this claim is false: deflationism does not entail that the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of such a conjunction, because the claims MacBride focuses on are in fact irrelevant to the motivations for truthmaker theory. Moreover, deflationists can consistently articulate and accept such motivations. Deflationism has no bearing on the plausibility of the truthmaker principle.

Description

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Oxford University Press via http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv081

Keywords

truthmaking, truthmaker principle, deflationism, MacBride

Journal Title

Analysis

Conference Name

Journal ISSN

0003-2638
1467-8284

Volume Title

76

Publisher

Oxford University Press (OUP)
Sponsorship
This work was supported by a studentship from the Arts and Humanities Research Council.