Can the Science of Well-Being Be Objective?
Accepted version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Alexandrova, Anna https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3226-6044
Abstract
Well-being, health and freedom are some of the many phenomena of interest to science whose definitions rely on a normative standard. Empirical generalizations about them thus present a special case of value-ladenness. I propose the notion of a 'mixed claim' to denote such generalizations. Against the prevailing wisdom, I argue that we should not seek to eliminate them from science. Rather, we need to develop principles for their legitimate use. Philosophers of science have already reconciled values with objectivity in several ways, but none of the existing proposals are suitable for mixed claims. Using the example of the science of well-being, I articulate a conception of objectivity for this science and for mixed claims in general.
Description
Keywords
5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields
Journal Title
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0007-0882
1464-3537
1464-3537
Volume Title
69
Publisher
Oxford Academic