Humanising Sociological Knowledge
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Authors
Publication Date
2016Journal Title
Social Epistemology
ISSN
0269-1728
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Volume
30
Pages
555-571
Language
English
Type
Article
Metadata
Show full item recordCitation
Morgan, M. (2016). Humanising Sociological Knowledge. Social Epistemology, 30 555-571. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2015.1119911
Abstract
This paper elaborates on the value of a humanistic approach to the production and
judgement of sociological knowledge by defending this approach against some common
criticisms. It argues that humanising sociological knowledge not only lends an appropriate
epistemological humility to the discipline, but also encourages productive knowledge
development by suggesting that a certain irreverence to what is considered known
is far more important for generating useful new perspectives on social phenomena
than defensive vindications of existing knowledge. It also suggests that the threat of
what is called “relativism” evoked by critics of humanised conceptions of knowledge is
largely illusory, and that in fact a far graver danger comes from dogmatic assertions
of social truth that claim to have somehow secured access to non-contingent arenas of
knowing, forestalling ongoing conversation, and tying future discovery to the limits of
current perspectives.
Keywords
humanism, philosophy of the social sciences, pragmatism, Durkheim, Bernard Williams, Rorty, Wittgenstein
Sponsorship
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number ES/
I902503/1]
Identifiers
External DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2015.1119911
This record's URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/253843
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