Hume and the Independent Witnesses
Accepted version
Peer-reviewed
Repository URI
Repository DOI
Change log
Authors
Ahmed, Arif https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7826-3335
Abstract
The Humean argument concerning miracles says that one should always think it more likely that anyone who testifies to a miracle is lying or deluded than that the alleged miracle actually occurred, and so should always reject any single report of it. A longstanding and widely accepted objection is that even if this is right, the concurring and non-collusive testimony of many witnesses should make it rational to believe in whatever miracle they all report. I argue that on the contrary, even multiple reports from non-collusive witnesses lack the sort of independence that could make trouble for Hume.
Description
Keywords
5003 Philosophy, 5004 Religious Studies, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies
Journal Title
Mind
Conference Name
Journal ISSN
0026-4423
1460-2113
1460-2113
Volume Title
124
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)